利用者:Yamasano chikuwa/sandbox
Power and Right of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP)
[編集]- (7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's warmaking power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.
- (12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.
- We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever actions may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representative of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration.
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- The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.
- WHEREAS the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare and to maintain international peace and security, and are therefore desirous of concluding a Treaty of Peace which will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the existence of a state of war between them;
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- Article 1
- (b) The Allied Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters.
John Foster Dulles's Speech at the San Francisco Peace Conference on September 5, 1951
[編集]- True peace is possible because of what has been accomplished by 6 years of Allied occupation. That occupation was calm and purposeful. Japan's war-making power was destroyed. The authority and influence of those who committed Japan to armed conquest was eliminated. Stern justice was meted out to the war criminals, while mercy was shown the innocent. There has come freedom of speech, of religion, of thought; and respect for fundamental human rights. There has been established, by the will of the people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government, which we are happy to welcome here.
- The Allied occupation goals set forth in the Potsdam Surrender Terms have been met, with the loyal cooperation of the Japanese people. It is now time to end that occupation, and make a peace which will restore Japan as a sovereign equal.
SCAPIN and related documents before peace treaty with Japan
[編集]- 1. The Imperial Japanese Government is directed to cease exercising, or attempting to exercise, governmental or administrative authority over any area outside of Japan, or over any government officials and employees or any other persons within such areas.
- 3. For the purpose of this directive, Japan is defined to include the four main islands of Japan (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku) and the approximately 1,000 smaller adjacent islands, including the Tsushima Islands and the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands north of 30° North Latitude (excluding Kuchinoshima Island); and excluding (a) Utsuryo (Ullung) Island, Liancourt Rocks (Take Island) and Quelpart (Saishu or Cheju) Island, (b) the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands[…]
- 5. The definition of Japan contained in this directive shall also apply to all future directives, memoranda and orders from this Headquarters unless otherwise specified therein.
- 6. Nothing in this directive shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration.
Japan-GHQ meeting on 13 February 1946
[編集]- The record of the first meeting concerning the administrative separation.
- (1946) February 13 To follow is a summary of the first meeting of the officer Ohda with two officers from GS; Captain Lodge(?) and Lieutenant Pool(?).
- Ohda: “We came here only to ask about the doubtful points, apart from the land belonging or validity of the SCAPIN.
- GHQ: This command was made merely for administrative convenience for allied powers and it was to confirm the things that we have already done, so that other matters are not within our jurisdiction. For example, Oshima is within CINPAC’s (sic) jurisdiction, Utsuryojima (Ulleungdo) is under the command of the 24th corps. So the separated realm of Japan decided by this command has nothing to do with territorial issues. These should be decided at the Peace Conference later.
U.S. Army Military Government - South Korea: Interim Government Activities, No.1, August 1947
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- Representatives of the Fisheries Bureau and Korea History and Geography Association left for Ullung-do and Tok-to on August. The latter, two small islands about 40 miles southwest of Ullung-do, is an excellent base for extended fishing operations.
- Formerly belonging to Japan, a recent occupation directive which drew an arbitrary line demarcating Japanese and Korean fishing waters placed Tok-to within the Korean zone. Final disposition of the islands' jurisdiction awaits the peace treaty.
- 1. The provisions of references (a) and (b), and paragraphs 1 and 3 of reference (c) in so far as they relate to authorization of Japanese fishing areas, are rescinded.
- 3. For the purpose of this directive, Japan is defined to include the four main islands of Japan (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku) and the approximately 1,000 smaller adjacent islands, including the Tsushima Islands and the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands north of 30°North Latitude (excluding Kuchinoshima Island), and excluding (a) Utsuryo (Ullung) Island, Liancourt Rocks (Take Island) and Quelpart (Saishu or Cheju Island), (b) the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands[…]
- 5. The present authorization is not an expression of allied policy relative to ultimate determination of national jurisdiction, international boundaries or fishing rights in the area concerned or in any other area.
- 1. The islands of Liancourt Rocks (or Takes Shima), located 37° 15’ north, 131° 50’ east, are designated as a bombing range.
- 2. The inhabitants of Oki-Retto (Oki-Gunto) and the inhabitants of all the ports on the west coast of Honshu north to the 38th parallel, north latitude will be notified prior to each actual use of this range. This information will be disseminated through Military Government units to local Japanese civil authorities.
- 2. The islands of Liancourt Rocks (Take-Shima) located 37°15’ North, 131°52’ East are designated as a bombing range.
- 4. The inhabitants of Oki-Retto (Oki-Gunto) and the inhabitants of all the ports on the west coast of the island of Honshu north to the 40th parallel, north latitude, will be notified fifteen days prior to use of this Range. When the Range is used for periods in excess of fifteen days, warning reminders will be disseminated to the inhabitants indicated above every fifteen days. This information will quarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the Japanese Government for dissemination to the local civil authorities in the areas concerned.
Trace the history of Korean claim about the transfer of sovereignty and Reaction by USA
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- 1.My Government requests that the word “renounces” in Paragraph a, Article Number 2, should be replaced by “confirms that it renounced on August 9,1945, all right, title and claim to Korea and the islands which were part of Korea prior to its annexation by Japan, including the island Quelpart, Port Hamilton, Dagelet, Dokdo and Parangdo.”
Korea-US meeting on July 19, 1951
[編集]- SECRET
- [Washington,] July 19, 1951
- Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty
- Participants: Dr. Yu Chan Yang, Korean
- Ambassador
- Mr. Pyo Wook Han, First Secretary, Korean Embassy
- Ambassador John Foster Dulles Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs
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- After reading the Ambassador's communication, Mr. Dulles discussed the three points contained therein. With regard to the first point, Mr. Dulles was in doubt that the formula confirming Japan's renunciation of certain territorial claims to Korea, could be included in the treaty in the form suggested by the ROK. He explained that the terms of the Japanese surrender instrument of August 9, 1945 did not, of themselves, technically consititute a formal and final determination of this question. He added, however, that the Department would consider including in the treaty a clause giving retroactive effect to the Japanese renunciation of territorial claims to August 9, 1945. The Korean Ambassador replied that if this were done he believed that the point raised by his Government would be met satisfactorily.
- [...][1]
- The United States Government does not feel that the Treaty should adopt the theory that Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on August 9, 1945 constituted a formal or final renunciation of sovereignty by Japan over the areas dealt with in the Declaration.
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- The Government of the United States regrets that it is unable to accept the Korean Government's amendment to Article 9 of the draft treaty. In view of the many national interests involved, any attempt to include in the treaty provisions governing fishing in high seas areas would indefinitely delay the treaty's conclusion. It is desired to point out, however, that the so-called MacArthur line will stand until the treaty comes into force, and that Korea, which obtains the benefits of Article 9, will have the opportunity of negotiating a fishing agreement with Japan prior to that date.
- Article 1
- (b) The Allied Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters.
- Article 2
- (a) Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.
Korean diplomatic document to US embassy on September 21, 1951
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- This note is to seek to draw your attention to the enclosed exerpt of Memorandum of SCAPIN-677, 29 January 1946, which should be regarded as a conslusive factor in deciding, in Korean favor, the controversy over the ownership of Dokdo, known as "Liancourt Rocks" and also as "Takeshima" in Japanese. The fact that the disputed isle has been put on the Korean side of the MacArthur Line is another manifestation of the SCAP memorandum under notice.
- In 1948, if I do not remember wrongly, when air bombing practice caused casualities among the Korean fishermen in boats nestling near the isle SCAP apologized to this Goverment for the incident. Had SCAP regarded the isle as Japanese territory, the presence of the Koreans there would have been illegal and no apologies necessary. As evidenced by the Memorandum in question, SCAP has, at no time, doubted that the isle belongs or ought to belong, to Korea.
- We have substantial documented evidence to prove that the isle has been in the Korean possession for many hundred years. The fact that Japan incorporated the isle into one of its nearby prefectures in 1905 (a deal sneaked on a prefectural level, not on a Governmental level, for the obvious convenience to back down more easily in case of a possible international trouble) cannot repudiate our rightful claims to the isle, supported not merely by Korean documents but by Japanese ones also.
Transmittal of Korean letter to US Dos on October 3, 1951
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- There is transmitted herewith for the information of the Department a copy of a letter with enclosure dated September 21, 1951, from the Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs placing a claim to the island of Dokdo, also known as “Liancourt Rocks” and “Takeshima” in Japanese. There is also enclosed a copy of the Ambassador’s acknowledgement of this latter.
- It will be noted that the latter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs bases Korean claim to this island largely on the basis of SCAPIN 677, January 29, 1946, an excerpt of which is enclosed with the latter, and the fact that the island was placed on the Korean side of the “MacArthur Line”.
- With regard to the " substantial documented evidence" referred to in the last paragraph of the letter, an officer of the Embassy was orally informed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that such evidence appears throughout Korean and Japanese archives. The implication was that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not possess a compilation of such "evidence" at this time. Although it was pointed out to the Minister that the Embassy would welcome the submission of such "evidence" for transmittal to the Department, it appears doubtful that such information will be forthcoming.
- The action of the United States-Japan Joint Committee in designating these rocks as a facility of the Japanese Government is therefore justified. The Korean claim, based on SCAPIN 677 of January 29, 1946, which suspended Japanese administration of various island areas, including Takeshima (Liancourt Rocks), did not preclude Japan from exercising sovereignty over this area permanently. A later SCAPIN, No. 1778 of September 16, 1947 designated the islets as a bombing range for the Far East Air Force and further provided that use of the range would be made only after notification through Japanese civil authorities to the inhabitants of the Oki Islands and certain ports on Western Honsu.
Letter from Headquarters Far East Command to Dos on November 27, 1952
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- The question of international sovereignty is, of course, outside General Clark’s authority. However, I should like to point out that in all instructions (SCAPINs) to the Japanese Government regarding authorization of areas for Japanese fishing and Whaling which were established under SCAP, there appeared a statement reading essentially, “the present authorization is not an expression of allied policy relative to ultimate determination of national jurisdiction, international boundaries or fishing rights in area concerned or in any other area.”
Letter from US Dos to American Embassy, London and Moscow on July 1, 1955
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- 5.SCAPIN 677 was operational directive to Japanese Gorvernment tentative in character and specifically states para 6 that it is not Allied policy determination of Japanese territory.
