ミュンヘン条約 (1619年)

ミュンヘン条約（ミュンヘンじょうやく、ドイツ語: Vertrag von München）は1619年 10月8日、神聖ローマ皇帝フェルディナント2世とバイエルン公マクシミリアン1世の間でミュンヘンにて締結された条約。スペイン大使のオニャテ伯爵（英語版）はフェルディナント2世を説得して、プファルツ選帝侯領の占領地、およびプファルツ選帝侯フリードリヒ5世の選帝侯位がマクシミリアン1世に与えられるよう仕向けた。オニャテはさらに自分を権限を越えて、フェルディナント2世のボヘミア反乱鎮圧にスペインが支援すると確約した。条約に基づき、カトリック連盟の盟主であるマクシミリアン1世がバイエルン軍をフェルディナント2世に提供、その見返りとしてプファルツの領地を与えられた^[1]。

脚注

^ Sutherland, p. 614. In electing Frederick, Bohemia formalized her connection with the militant German princes, her last remaining hope. But the Union was not militant, and Frederick had acted rashly without first securing its full support - or apparently any support at all. Yet he must have seen the cracks appearing at the Rothenburg assembly. Opposing their leaders and concerned for their own defence, the members of the Union were not prepared to save Bohemia, but only to support the Palatinate in Germany - a factitious distinction difficult to sustain. In this confusion, the Spanish ambassador, Oñate, was quick to exert his influence. Serious Catholic action against Bohemia and the Palatinate derived from the treaty of Munich (8 October 1619) between Ferdinand and Maximilian of Bavaria, leader of the Catholic League. With a total disregard for German interests, Oñate persuaded Ferdinand to offer Maximilian any part of the Palatinate he could occupy, together with Frederick's electoral title - an arrangement Spain was later to regret. Oñate, exceeding his instructions, also guaranteed the Spanish support without which Maximilian would not play. These disruptive agreements were to have serious, long-term repercussions. Not only were they illegal; they were designed to alter the balance of the electoral college in Ferdinand's favour. In the short term, the treaty secured a Catholic army which, together with Spanish help, defeated Frederick and the Bohemian rebels on 8 November 1620 - the battle of the White Mountain.

参考文献

Sutherland, N.M. The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Structure of European Politics. Oxford University Press: The English Historical Review, Vol 107, No. 424, pp. 587-625, July 1992.

[1] Sutherland, p. 614. In electing Frederick, Bohemia formalized her connection with the militant German princes, her last remaining hope. But the Union was not militant, and Frederick had acted rashly without first securing its full support - or apparently any support at all. Yet he must have seen the cracks appearing at the Rothenburg assembly. Opposing their leaders and concerned for their own defence, the members of the Union were not prepared to save Bohemia, but only to support the Palatinate in Germany - a factitious distinction difficult to sustain. In this confusion, the Spanish ambassador, Oñate, was quick to exert his influence. Serious Catholic action against Bohemia and the Palatinate derived from the treaty of Munich (8 October 1619) between Ferdinand and Maximilian of Bavaria, leader of the Catholic League. With a total disregard for German interests, Oñate persuaded Ferdinand to offer Maximilian any part of the Palatinate he could occupy, together with Frederick's electoral title - an arrangement Spain was later to regret. Oñate, exceeding his instructions, also guaranteed the Spanish support without which Maximilian would not play. These disruptive agreements were to have serious, long-term repercussions. Not only were they illegal; they were designed to alter the balance of the electoral college in Ferdinand's favour. In the short term, the treaty secured a Catholic army which, together with Spanish help, defeated Frederick and the Bohemian rebels on 8 November 1620 - the battle of the White Mountain.

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